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Abstract
Why is it that well-intentioned actions can create persistent con-
icts? While norms are widely regarded as a source for cooperation,
this article proposes a novel theory in which the emergence of norms
can be understood as a bargaining process in which normative con-
icts explain the nally emerging norm. The theory is tested with a
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eort or eciency for the distribution of joint earnings. Normative
conict is measured by the number of rejected oers in a recursive
bargaining game. The emerging normative system is analyzed by feed-
back cycles between micro- and macro-level. It is demonstrated that
more normative cues cause more normative conict. Further, under
the structural conditions of either simple or complex situations, the
convergence towards a simple and widely shared norm is likely. In con-
trast, in moderately complex situations, convergence is unlikely and
several equally reasonable norms co-exist. The ndings are discussed
with respect to the integration of sociological conict theory with the
bargaining concept in economic theory.
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Why is it that well-intentioned actions can create persistent conicts? What
is the reason that norm adherence is often not enough for the creation of
social order and that even the overcoming of self-interest does not suce for
the establishment of lasting cooperative relations?
For example, wage schemes depend heavily on social norms employers
and employees adhere to (Elster 1989). For some people, xed, equal wages
are appropriate, while others call for the consideration of individual eort
(e.g. piece rate wages), or regard the individually created added value as
important. Also combinations of these input and output measures are possi-
ble and can create normative conicts among holders of more complex rules
with those of simpler rules.
Also everyday examples support the notion that well-intended, coopera-
tive actions can create normative conicts: Consider a Ph.D. student has a
common lunch with her supervisor and both want to signal their cooperative
intentions. However, they may experience tensions or even conicts if they
want to split their bill based on dierent rules, be it an equal split, based
on their individual consumption, status based (the professor pays), or even
combinations of these rules (e.g. the professor pays the drinks but the meal
is paid individually).
We believe that the emergence of norms should be understood as a process
of conict in which actors bargain over dierent rules regarding how mutual
cooperation should be achieved. In this perspective, norms are typically
subject to negotiations and continual bargaining. The emerging macro-level
system of norms therefore heavily depends on the micro-level dynamics of
how actors reach agreements concerning which norm ought to be followed.
The inherent dynamical nature and the mechanisms of normative conict
have not been fully addressed yet in the literature on social norms.
The dynamics of normative conict and the resulting emergence of nor-
mative systems can be illustrated by examples from the sociology of science:
While most academic disciplines have agreed on what makes a \good" pub-
lication, two norms co-exist in sociology: publishing in books and publishing
in peer-reviewed journals (Clemens et al. 1995). Publications have enor-
mous inuence on the eld, as reputation, grant acquisitions, or getting a job
largely rests on publication records. Especially in mixed genre departments,
however, nding the right merit metric may lead to conicts and prolonged
faculty meetings due to conicting opinions about what constitutes a good
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on, wastes resources and persist, because actors adhere to dierent norms.
Similarly, multiple norms for receiving credit for authorship co-exist be-
tween and within dierent academic elds (Zuckerman 1968, Hudson 1996,
Tscharntke et al. 2007). Alphabetic ordering, bracketing (with the main con-
tributor as the rst-author and the supervisor in the end), ordering based on
merits (in a decreasing order based on relative contributions), or even mul-
tiple rst-authors (with a footnote identifying all authors who contributed
equally to the work). If norms clash and authors cannot agree on which norm
should apply for the ordering of names, fruitful collaborations do not come
about and even nished manuscripts can remain unpublished.
Our contribution investigates the evolution of norms from normative con-
ict. While previous analyses focused on demonstrating the existence of nor-
mative conict (Winter, Rauhut, and Helbing forthcoming), it remains open
how ongoing bargaining over norms at the micro-level leads to convergence
of which norms at the population level. We develop a measurement of the
persistence of normative conict by using a bargaining experiment in which
we introduce dierent normative cues, resulting in the adherence to dier-
ent norms and expectations. Our design builds up on experimental work
by Gantner, G uth, and K onigstein (2001), Winter et al. (forthcoming) and
Rauhut and Winter (2010). The novel experimental design proposed here
allows to study the dynamical interplay between micro-level bargaining over
norms and the emergence of normative systems at the macro-level.
2 A conict theory of norm emergence
We illustrate our theory by referring to the example of normative conict
among co-authors. For the sake of simplicity, suppose two scientists co-
author an academic article. Before submitting the article for publication,
they have to decide who the rst author of the paper should be. Let us
further assume that the situation is ambiguous in the sense that there is no
predominant norm in the eld regarding the order of authors.
In such situations, several cues may be relevant. A cue is dened as
a variable which determines the kind of behavior that is prescribed or pro-
scribed in a norm-relevant situation. For example, if the co-authors are equal
in every way, they may consider an alphabetical order of their names to sig-
nal equal contributions. However, if the co-authors dier in their eort, their
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(cf. Tscharntke et al. 2007).
A dierent number of considered cues may lead to the emergence of dier-
ent norms. In this respect, we distinguish between less complex or uncondi-
tional norms and more complex or conditional norms. Unconditional norms
do not require information about the context of the decision, for instance
information about individual contributions to the article. A paradigmatic
example is the equality norm (Winter et al. forthcoming). Equality norms
aim at ex post equality, which would relate to an alphabetical or random
ordering of authorship in our example. In contrast, conditional norms do
require information about the context of the decision. An example of a con-
ditional norm is the equity norm, which states that \the value of what a
member of a group receives from other members should be proportional to
his investments" (Homans 1961:237). In our example, credit for authorship
would be received for eort or in other cases for status.
The process of normative conict and the emerging normative system
can be understood as feedback cycles between micro- and macro-level: A
larger number of normative cues at the macro-level makes the situation more
ambiguous, leading to more normative conict at the micro-level which even-
tually results in the emergence of dierent norms at the macro-level. This
mechanism is depicted in Figure 1.
Our idea is that the multiplicity of cues leads to heterogeneity in beliefs
and in norms among individuals (the meso level). For example, co-authors
who agree on a conditional norm could still have dierent beliefs whether
to condition on status (seniority), on actual contributions (eort put in the
article) or on the achieved level of improvement of the article (generated
outcome from the eort). This heterogeneity in beliefs may lead to conict
at the meso level, which we call normative conict. Normative conict is
thus dened as conict due to the adherence to dierent normative beliefs.
Of course, a larger number of normative cues does not necessarily lead to
more ambiguity. It is particularly likely that normative conict arises from
ambiguous situations, if the actor's norms are not readily on display. Some-
times, we can quite reliably infer an individual's norms from specic signals,
which may reduce the extent of normative conict. A monk wearing a cowl
signals rather unambiguously his religious norms, whereas a random person's
beliefs may be harder to assess.
Normative conict is instantiated at the meso level, i.e. among interacting
individuals. We can understand the structure of conict from bottom-up
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initial beliefs and norms of individuals and their resulting actions. In our
example, individuals may hold dierent beliefs regarding how much eort,
status or improvement dierent co-authors accomplished and which of these
cues are valid for the respective norm they hold.1 The interplay of norms and
beliefs then determines the ordering of names a person considers appropriate.
Normative conict emerges at the meso level if the co-authors reach dierent
conclusions regarding which order of authors should be applied.
In a nutshell, normative conict emerges in ambiguous situations in which
multiple cues lead to heterogeneity in beliefs and actions at the individual
level. If there is no commonly shared hierarchy of cues, individuals will not
a priori agree on one focal norm and conict emerges at the meso level.
Therefore, our rst hypothesis concerns the purported relationship between
ambiguity of the situation and the extent of normative conict.
Hypothesis 1 The more normative cues, the stronger the nor-
mative conict.
We conjecture that more normative cues will increase the strength
of normative conict as each cue triggers dierent norms. In our
experiment, the number of normative cues is varied in the treat-
ments and the strength of normative conict is measured by the
length of the negotiation (the number of bargaining rounds).
Normative conict is essentially a dynamical concept and contributes to
the understanding of the emergence of norms. In most situations, the bar-
gaining process triggers an updating of the beliefs and norms. In our exam-
ple, an initial conict may be followed by a change of the co-authors' views
regarding the appropriate order of their names. This is illustrated by the
right-hand side of Figure 1. After conict at the interaction level, beliefs
and norms are updated at the micro level, and a new round of bargaining
begins. Back again at the micro level, individuals decide once more. In our
example they reconsider the order of co-authors. Theoretically, the process
of beliefs-actions-updates could be innitely repeated, but in the real world
and in experiments there usually exists a \natural" end to this process.
[Figure 1 about here.]
We term the feedback loops between individual and interaction level as
the negotiation of norms and the ones between interaction and population
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garding how the ambiguity of the situation aects the complexity of the
emerging norm can be understood by the dynamical negotiation of norms at
the interaction and individual level (Figure 1).
Taking into account the previous bargaining process, parties may nally
agree or disagree on which norm to follow. It is important to note that this
process of normative negotiations does not necessarily end up in agreement.
The long-term result of this process may also be persistent conict. In con-
trast, if parties reach an agreement, a specic norm has emerged. We under-
stand with norm emergence a process of convergence such that a suciently
large number of interaction partners repeatedly update their beliefs and con-
sequently adopt the same norm as the solution to their social interaction
problem. Therefore, our hypothesis about the relationship on the population
level considers how the ambiguity of the situation aects the complexity of
the emerging norm. A large number of cues may lead to many conicts and
nally to a simpler emerging norm than a lower number of cues.
Hypothesis 2 The more ambiguous the situation, the less com-
plex the emerging norm.
We conjecture an inversely u-shaped relationship. More ambigu-
ous situations trigger a larger extent of normative conicts, which
eventually results in less complex (unconditional) norms. In con-
trast, simpler situations trigger less conict and allow the emer-
gence of more complex (conditional) norms.
3 Application on distributive justice and def-
inition of fairness norms
To test our two hypotheses about normative conict, a laboratory study
in the specic domain of distributive justice was conducted. At least since
Homans (1961), sociologists have investigated the normative principles of
distributive justice. Homans (1961) and a number of other social scientists
(Adams 1965, Selten 1976, Cook and Hegtvedt 1983, G uth 1988) proposed
an equity norm, for which \the received benets of a group member should be
proportional to her investments" (Homans 1961:237). The dilemma is that
people \dier in their ideas of what legitimately constitutes investment, re-
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This may create transaction failures when several parties disagree due to
their dierent conceptions of what they consider as valid measures of equity
or proportionality.
Recent experimental studies demonstrate that people adhere to dierent
normative standards. Gantner et al. (2001) show that several equity stan-
dards are applied in bargaining situations. Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Kurki
(2004) nd that, besides selshness, two main behavioral norms determine in-
dividual decision making in distributive justice problems; egalitarianism and
equity. Equity is by far the most often observed behavioral pattern in their
experiments. Cappelen et. al (2007) report similar results. They propose a
pluralism of fairness ideals, where the concept of equity is decomposed into
the liberal egalitarian and the libertarian ideal. Liberal egalitarianism de-
notes input equity, for which actors are rewarded according to their previous
eort. Libertarianism denotes output equity, for which actors are rewarded
according to their achievements for the joint good, regardless of the eort
with which this achievement was produced.
Our operationalization uses the set of normative principles proposed by
Cappelen et al. (2007). More specically, three fairness norms will be con-
sidered.
1. The equality norm states that the common good should be divided
equally and actors' contributions to the good should be ignored. This
ensures ex post equality of outcomes.
2. The equity norm demands that the common good should be distributed
in proportion to actors' eorts into providing the common good. Equity
refers to the input of eorts and not to actual contributions to the good.
3. The libertarian norm considers actual contributions to the good. This
principle refers to output equity, meaning actors' contributions to the
common good. Accordingly, the good should be distributed in propor-
tion to participants' actual contributions, which can be a function of
individual eort, but also of other factors for which the individual is not
accountable for. Common examples include luck, genetic disposition,
or parents' socio-economic status.
An unintended consequence of people following dierent normative stan-
dards at the micro level is normative conict at the macro level. Actors can
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ior can be perceived as improper. In this view, in a context where several
standards are possible, social norms are not only promoting cooperation and
social welfare, as previous theoretical and empirical literature has posited;
they can also undermine it.
4 Method
4.1 Procedure and participants
The experiment was conducted using the z-Tree software developed by Fisch-
bacher (2007). The subjects were 72 male and 116 female undergraduate stu-
dents from a large European university, recruited from a wide range of aca-
demic disciplines with the online recruiting system ORSEE (Greiner 2004).2
The average earnings per subject were 14.19 Euro (2 = 3:28) and ranged
from a minimum of 2.56 Euro to a maximum of 25.11 Euro, including a
show-up fee of 2.50 Euro.
4.2 Experimental design
Our measurement of the persistence of normative conict uses a recursive
random bargaining protocol. It introduces a larger number of dierent nor-
mative cues as in Gantner et al. (2001) and Winter et al. (forthcoming). Our
design consists of two stages. In stage 1, the subjects earn money in a real
eort task, in stage two they bargain with changing partners about how to
split the joint earnings.
4.3 The real eort task
At the beginning of each session, the subjects were randomly seated in cu-
bicles with computer terminals. Some general instructions regarding the
procedure were given on the computer screen (Schmelz 2010) and read out
loud to ensure that everybody understood them and to demonstrate that
everybody had received the same instructions. In the following real eort
task, subjects had to answer 20 questions on a seven-page long text of a
Wikipedia entry on the Westminster Palace, which they had received ve
days in advance by email.3 There were ve answer categories, one of which
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experimental currency units (ECU), which were later transformed into Euros
at an exchange rate of 100 ECU = 1 Euro. An accompanying letter informed
the subjects that their preparation of the text will inuence their possible
earnings in the experiment. Thus, every subject could decide on her own as
to invest spare time in order to earn more money later on.
4.4 The bargaining game
In the bargaining part, the joint earnings of two randomly drawn players
were pooled to form the pie. This procedure was designed to induce a feeling
of personal eort and inherent monetary earnings. In particular, the eort
was real in the sense that subjects could spend their own spare time.
After completing the quiz, the subjects received the instructions for the
bargaining game experiment sketched in gure 2. In our game, two players
bargained over several periods over the sum of money jointly produced in
the quiz. In each period, both players could oer a share of the pie to
the other player. At the same time, they entered an acceptance threshold,
stating what the other player had to oer at least so that the oer was
acceptable. As soon as both players submitted their respective oers and
acceptance thresholds, the computer randomly chose one of the oers with
equal probability. This oer was compared to the other player's threshold
and was accepted if it was at least as high as the other player's threshold.
In case of acceptance, the accepting player yielded the oer and the oering
player received what was left on the joint account. If the oer was below the
responder's threshold, the game proceeded to the next period and the pie
shrinked by 2(t 1) ECU in each period t. Note that the costs of delay are an
increasing function of the length of bargaining, meaning that disagreement is
cheap in the beginning and becomes increasingly expensive over time. Players
continued this bargaining process until they either reached agreement or no
more money was left on the account.
[Figure 2 about here.]
The bargaining game was repeated 10 times with one initial unpaid trial
period with random matching in matching groups of 16 subjects. Before the
beginning of the experiment, subjects had to answer test questions regarding
the game. This allowed us to verify that the participants understood the
10
Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 018rules. For exclusion of wealth eects, one of the 10 potentially payment-
relevant rounds was randomly selected for payment. The experiment started
when there were no further questions to the experimenter.
4.5 Treatments and measures
For the measurement of the dynamics of normative conict, we introduced
cues which were designed to trigger norms of equity, equality or libertarian-
ism.
The dierent normative cues were implemented in three dierent treat-
ments, ranging from only one cue up to three cues. Equality was implemented
in the C-treatment, where we transferred 1200 ECU for each player to the
joint account. In this case, all norms prescribed an equal split. In the E-
treatment, we implemented heterogeneity in eorts by composing the \pie"
from the individual earnings in the quiz. Only if subjects were sensitive
to equity or eciency norms, they would condition their behavior on the
other player's eort. In addition to heterogeneous eorts, the F-treatment
implemented eciency by randomly assigning subjects to dierent eciency
factors, which subjects kept throughout the experiment. These factors were
used as multipliers of the subjects' contributions to the common pool, such
that the contributions of half of the subjects in treatment F were tripled,
while the other player's gains from the quiz were counted only once. In this
respect, some subjects were more ecient than others. Here, only those sub-
jects who were sensitive to the libertarian norm would take this factor into
account, while subjects adhering to the equity norm would only rely on the
other player's relative earnings from the quiz. Those interested in equality
would split the pie equally. Table 1 gives an overview over the treatments
and the respective composition of the pie.
[Table 1 about here.]
Oers and acceptance thresholds were submitted on a single screen, where
the provided information depended on the treatment. In all treatments, sub-
jects were informed about the remaining size of the pie, the initial transfers
to the joint account, and a table describing the pie size for all bargaining
rounds. In addition to that, the E-treatment provided the absolute and
relative contributions from correct quiz answers of both players. In the F-
treatment, subjects' also learned about the eciency of their contributions,
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ciency factors.
Subjects submitted their oers and acceptance thresholds with sliders on
the computer screen, which automatically calculated and displayed the re-
sulting absolute and relative distribution. After submitting the oers and
thresholds, subjects proceeded to the information screen. This screen dis-
played both players' oers, the own acceptance threshold, which oer was
selected and whether this oer was accepted.
Table ?? relates the theoretical constructs from gure 1 to the opera-
tionalization of the dependent and independent variables and to the statistics
in the results section.
[Table 2 about here.]
5 Results
5.1 The bargaining process
Figure 3 gives an exemplary impression of the bargaining process. The gure
depicts the decisions of two players (black and grey) until they reach an
agreement in the F-treatment. Both players answered the same number of
questions correctly, however, the black player's contribution was tripled, such
that this player eectively put in 75 %, while the other player contributed
only 25 %. A black/grey circle depicts the relative oer of the black/grey
player towards the other player in shares of the pie, while a black/grey cross
depicts the respective player's acceptance threshold.
[Figure 3 about here.]
The grey player oers and accepts around 50 % for quite some time,
which corresponds to our denition of an equality player. The black player,
on the other hand, adheres to the libertarian norm by oering only slightly
less than 25 % and accepting about 75 %. This ts what the player eectively
contributed to the pie.
We chose the display of this case due to the long duration of the bargaining
process, which exemplies severe normative conict. No player wanted to
give in rst and their hassle would probably have continued if there would
have been money left on their accounts after the 12th round.
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a pre-test session of this experiment. The conversations among the bargainers
often referred to fairness arguments and would become increasingly angry
when the counterpart made unappropriate oers.
5.2 Consequences of normative conict: Costly delays
Our hypothesis 1 states that the strength of normative conict increases
with the number of normative cues. Figure 4 gives a rst \eye-ball"-test of
this claim, plotting the number of rounds until agreement was reached for
all treatments. In all treatments, a considerable fraction of interactions al-
ready ended in the rst period because agreements were immediately reached.
However, from period two onwards, the bold line representing treatment C
is always above the two other lines, meaning that subjects in this treatment
found an agreement faster than those in the other two treatments.
In addition to the cumulative density plot in gure 4, we estimated a
random eects poisson regression model in order to test our claim more
systematically (see the table in gure 4).4 We chose a random eects model in
order to adjust for correlated errors in multiple decisions of single individuals.
Because rounds of bargaining are discrete count-data, we used a poisson
model and not a linear random eects model.
[Figure 4 about here.]
The regression results generally conrm hypothesis 1. The strength of
conict (measured by bargaining rounds) is signicantly higher in the F-
treatment involving three cues compared to the C-treatment involving just a
single cue (t = 4:20, p < 0:001 if controlled for subject specic errors and t =
2:00, p < 0:05 if controlled for subject and group). In addition, the dierence
between the E-treatment (two cues) and the C treatment is signicant (t =
2:30, p < 0:05 and t = 1:76, p < 0:10, respectively). However, the dierence
between the E-treatment and the F-treatment is not statistically signicant,
meaning that the average time until subjects nd an agreement is about
equal in the two treatments.
5.3 Macro emergence of norms (mixture model)
Our second hypothesis states that the complexity of a situation has an in-
verse u-shaped eect on the emerging norm. To test this hypothesis, we
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data. We assume that the data are generated by three dierent types of
players, corresponding to the fairness norms introduced above. By using this
assumption, we can estimate the evolving population composition over time.
Technically speaking, we estimate the proportion of the dierent types in
a nite mixture model. These models have been originally introduced by
Pearson (1894), but have only recently become popular by the increase in
computational power.5 In sociology and social psychology, these models have
also been known as \latent class" or \structural equation" models (Harrison
and Rutstr om 2009).
Our analysis is based on a simplied version of the random behavioral
approach proposed by Conte and Moatt (2010). To estimate the parame-
ters of interest, we dene utility functions for up to three dierent types of
decisions and estimate the respective proportions of normative types j;j 2
fequality, equity, libertariang in the population.
As a rst step, we formally dene the three norms Ni;i 2 fequality, equity,
libertariang which we expect to nd in the population. Let  denote the size
of the pie, ei subject i's relative eort, and i subject i's eciency factor.













Moreover, decisions are usually a balance between norm adherence and
individual interests, meaning that normative expectations are often undercut.
We formally account for that observation by introducing a global \norm-
adherence term" , describing how much the average oer falls below the
respective fairness norm.6 Finally, decisions are often prone to little errors,
which we capture by an error term i  N(0;2).
The desired share of the pie ~ x is a function of the player's norm, her
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As a matter of fact, our experimental design does not allow us to dis-
criminate between all types in every treatment. Consequently, we can only
estimate the share of those types we can clearly identify in a given treatment,
resulting in dierent models for dierent treatments. From the dierent util-
ity functions introduced above, we can construct the following models, where



























for the F-treatment, where we can identify the three types equality, equity
and libertarians.
Given our experimental data matrix X, we can maximize the likelihood
of the functions 3 and 4 and jointly obtain estimates for the population
shares equality;equity (and libertarian in the F-treatment), as well es the
norm-adherence  and the variance of the errors .7
[Figure 5 about here.]
Figure 5 displays the oers and thresholds in the C treatment and fur-
thermore the estimated mixing proportions of normative types j in the
15
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wards the equal split, both in oers and even more pronounced in acceptance
thresholds. In the E-treatment, the equity and the equality norm co-exist
throughout the whole experiment.8 In the E-treatment, both norms for oer
behavior co-exist without convergence over time. For acceptance thresholds,
there is also co-existence of both norms. In the F-treatment, the complex
situation leads to the emergence of a simple equality norm, as stated by hy-
pothesis 2. Though already prevalent in the beginning, the estimated share
of equality oers approaches roughly 80 % in the end. The same is true for
acceptance thresholds: The equality line is above the equity line most of the
time. Furthermore, it is constantly increasing from period four onwards.
To connect the two analyses in gures 4 and 5, we estimate the proba-
bility of severe conict in a logit model. It follows from our theory that the
convergence towards a single norm (as observed in treatments C and F, see
gure 5) reduces the probability that the complete pie is lost after ongoing,
persistent conict. Although the number of these \worst-case" outcomes is
small compared to the overall number of interactions, a respective random
intercept logit model can still be estimated. This model adjusts for correlated
errors within individuals and matching groups. In addition, we correct for
the fact that one interaction consists of one interaction among two players,
which means that our sample size is half compared to an individual-level
analysis.
[Table 3 about here.]
The results show that there are no signicant dierences between treat-
ment C and treatment F, but the likelihood of severe conict is signicantly
higher in the E-treatment.9 This conrms the robustness of our mixture
model: The likelihood of conict decreases if a population converges towards
a norm. This means that the collective convergence to a shared norm reduces
the costs of normative conict. Such convergence can be easier achieved in
simple or complex situations and is more dicult for moderately complex
situations.
6 Discussion and open questions
We have outlined a new theory of norm emergence. Our perspective draws
on the idea that the content of norms is negotiated in social interactions. If
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can generate serious transaction failures, which we refer to as normative
conict. Once an interaction does not work as expected and conict emerges,
\the right course of action" has to be negotiated in a dynamical process. Our
theory introduces macro-level variables, like the complexity of a situation, in
order to predict the content of the emerging norm. Therefore, our theory
opens the black box of \path dependence", a term often referred to in the
theoretical debate about the emergence of norms.
The concept of bargaining is essential in our theory of norm emergence.
Our theory bridges bargaining concepts in economics and sociology. In eco-
nomics, bargaining is a rigorous and therefore rather narrow concept which
can be represented in simple formal models (Nash 1950, Rubinstein 1982).
In sociology, the concept of bargaining is applied to a much greater variety
of social phenomena, for instance, to the meaning of certain words (i.e. so-
ciolects), rules of proper behavior or dress codes. Our general idea of norm
emergence certainly refers to the broader sociological concept. Our theory
can be generalized to a whole range of areas such as how we dress, talk, eat or
even die. In order to test our hypotheses, however, we have to operationalize
our theory into a tractable model of normative conict. Therefore, we chose
a specic formal bargaining model which can be experimentally tested.
The experimental results give a rst corroboration of our proposed theory
of norm emergence. Under the structural conditions of either simple or com-
plex situations, the population converges towards a simple, widely shared
norm. In contrast, in moderately complex situations, convergence is unlikely
and several equally reasonable and prominent norms co-exist. The robust-
ness of our ndings should be further tested in the the lab and in the eld:
Which norms emerge, if the information about individual claims is unreli-
able or fuzzy? Does this change the bargaining process and if so, how? Our
theory could be applied to very dierent kinds of norms and tested with a
number of dierent research designs, which could substantiate our general
theory.
Endnotes
1Note that two important forces can inuence the decision. The self-serving bias can
shape individual beliefs in a way that boosts own eorts and minimizes contributions of
others (Babcock, Wang, and Loewenstein 1996). In a similar fashion, the Thomas Theorem
(Merton 1995) highlights to focus rather on subjective beliefs than objective contributions
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2We ran 7 sessions with 3 sessions involving 32 subjects, two session involving 30
subjects, 2 sessions involving 16 subjects. Matching groups consisted of 16 subjects with
two exceptions of matching groups of 14 subjects.
3 Wikipedia contributors, "Westminster Palace," Wikipedia: The Free Encyclope-
dia, http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palace_of_Westminster (accessed May 04,2008
14:40)
4All statistical tests were performed using STATA 10.1.
5See McLachlan and Peel (2000) for an introduction and a survey of the development
of mixture models, and Aitkin and Rubin (1985) for an application to hypothesis testing.
6Conte and Moatt (2010) call it the \ selshness premium".
7Non-convergence is a common problem for the estimation of mixture models with
a numeric maximum-likelihood procedure if the proportion of one or more types in the
population is small (i.e. 9i : i ! 0). This is the case for the oers in period 9 and the
acceptance thresholds in period 6 and 10 in treatment F (see the right side of gure 5). In
this case, we restrict libertarian to 0 and estimate equation 3 instead of equation 4. This
is reected in Figure 5 by disconnected symbols at the respective periods.
8Note that the share of \equity-oers" is sometimes as high as 76 % (period 1), or as
low as 23 % (period 2).
9Note that the estimate of the E-treatment is signicantly dierent from zero if we
estimate a two-level model and only control for dependence of errors on the subject level.
It is only marginally dierent from zero if we additionally control for the dependence of
errors on the matching group level.
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Figure 1. A multilevel theory of the dynamics of normative conﬂict
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Figure 2. The bargaining game among two players A and B
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Figure 3. An exemplary interaction between two players (grey and black). The
dot () represents the respective player’s relative offer, the cross () the relative
acceptance threshold.
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subject, j = 188
var(intercept) 1.491 1.412
(19.97) (15.75)




t statistics in parentheses, + p < 0:10
 p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
Figure 4. Cumulated density plot of the strength of conﬂict in different treatments.
The horizontal lines represent the share of interactions in which an agreement has
been found in the respective period displayed on the X-axis. The table shows
two random-effects poisson models. Model (1) controls for subject speciﬁc errors,
model (2) additionally for group speciﬁc errors. They demonstrate a signiﬁcantly
higher strength of conﬂict in the F-treatment (p < 0:001 and p< 0:05, respectively)
and in the E-treatment (p < 0:05 and p< 0:10, respectively) compared to the C-
treatment. The dependent variable strength of conﬂict is measured by rounds of
bargaining.
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Figure 5. Distribution of different types of proposer decisions (top) and responder
decisions (bottom) as estimated in model 3 and 4. The horizontal axis denotes the
10 repetions of the bargaining game, the vertical axes the relative share of types
in the population. Types in the C-treatment are not estimated but decisions are
represented by box plots (outliers omitted). The model assumes two types in the E-
treatment (equity and equality), and three types in the F-treatment (equity, equality
and libertarian). In the treatments C, behavior converges towards the equal split.
In the E-treatment, there is co-existence of equity and equality norms. In the F-
treatment, the equality norm becomes increasingly prominent over time and the
libertarian norm vanishes.
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 018treatment pie ECU per eciency pie size
answer factor
C (control) given 10 { 2400
E (eort) produced 100 { e1 + e2





E (eort) X X
F (eciency) X X X
Table 1. Overview of treatments and number of normative cues in a given treat-
ment. The number of normative cues increases from C to E to F. l refers to the
low efﬁciency factor and h to the high efﬁciency factor.
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 018theoretical construct operationalization statistics
ambiguity of situation treatment variables (not applicable)
(number of cues)
heterogeneity of heterogeneity of mixture-model
norms oers/thresholds (gure 5)
initial beliefs not measured evidence from the
initial norms directly video lab
actions oer / threshold exemplary interactions
(gure 3)
normative conict rounds of bargaining cdf-plot,
until agreement random eects poisson
model (gure 4)
nal (dis-)agreement no agreement logit model (table 3)
until the end
complexity of oer/threshold mixture model
prevailing norm (gure 5)
Table 2. Overview of theoretical constructs, their operationalization and corre-
sponding statistics
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t statistics in parentheses, + p < 0:10
 p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
Table 3. Random effects logistic regression. The dependent variable represents
whether a bargaining couple did not ﬁnd a solution in the bargaining process until
the end where all money was gone due to bargaining costs. Model (1) controls for
subject speciﬁc errors, model (2) additionally for group speciﬁc errors.
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